Summary Threat Type Vulnerabilities Surface Matrix Motivations Kill Chain Recommendations Appendix
Print Report

Deepfake Lai Ching-Te (賴清德) giving press conference

Submitted File

In December 2023, altered video footage with Lai Ching-Te's synthesized voice portrayed him as supporting a coalition between the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and falsely depicted him commenting on DPP scandals

Threat Level

Low

Moderate

Elevated

High


Authenticity Spectrum

Real

Suspicious

Likely Fake

Fake



Deepfake Attack Profile

Credibility

Moderate

The more synthetic media is perceived to be legitimate and authoritative, the content is more likely to be trusted, persuasive, and acted upon.

Interactivity

Low

Synthetic media can range from non-interactive, not ongoing, or not consistent (low) to interactive, ongoing, and consistent (high).

Familiarity

Moderate

Synthetic media can range from very recognizable and familiar (high) or hardly (or not) recognizable and familiar (low).

Evocation

High

Synthetic media can range from evoking a significant affective response (high) to barely or not at all eliciting an affective reaction.

Distribution

Mediumcast

Synthetic media can range from broadcast to a wide human audience or technical security measures (high) to a narrow, specific human audience or tailored technical security measure (low).


Deepfake & Synthetic Media Analysis Framework (DSMAF) Assessment™. The media submitted for this Deepfake Threat Intelligence Report (DTIR) was assessed with the Psyber Labs Deepfake & Synthetic Media Analysis Framework (DSMAF)™, a set of psychological, sociological and affective influence factors and sub-facets, that when holistically applied, inform the motivations, intentions, and targeting process in synthetic media and deepfake propagation. The findings of each DSMAF factor is described in respective sections and graphically plotted on the Deepfake Risk Factor Radar. The combined DSMAF findings are given a Synthetic Media Threat Level (Low, Medium, Elevated, or High) for actionable awareness and risk mitigation.

Threat Type

Threat Type is the category of intended purpose and the risk proposed by the synthetic media or deepfake. Often, cyber deception efforts through deepfake content are multi-purpose, and a result, are categorized with multiple threat types.

Digital Impersonation for Disinformation

Deepfake technology intentionally using the likeness of famous and/or credible authorities in an effort to shape the behaviors, attitudes, beliefs and/or emotions of the target audience

Collective Outrage Trigger

Adversaries seeking to outrage target audiences, resulting in collective mentality to mobilize into volatile engagements or damaging, violent protest

Propaganda

Information, especially of a biased, misleading or non-rational nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view

Political Instigator

The media is intended to serve as a catalyst for political argument, discord and divisiveness.

Disinformation

False information purposely spread to influence public opinion or obscure the truth

Influence Operation

Influence operations, also known as information operations or psychological operations, are strategic approaches used to shape the perceptions, decisions, and behaviors of target audiences to achieve specific objectives.

Deception

Intentional strategy and tactics meant to mislead, misdirect and manipulate the perceptions of a target audience through simulation (showing the false) and/or dissimulation (hiding the real)

Rumor Generation

Creation and dissemination of unverified information, which is often speculative and lacks a solid basis in fact

Spamouflage

Tactic leveraging thousands of inauthentic accounts across numerous social media platforms, websites, and forums that promote various narratives in support of the political interests of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Hostile Social Manipulation

Chinese tactic of targeted social media campaigns, sophisticated forgeries, cyberbullying and harassment of individuals, distribution of rumors and conspiracy theories, and other tools and approaches to cause damage to the target state

Hybrid Warfare

The interplay or fusion of conventional as well as unconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion

CCP Perception Management

Chinese Communist Party Perception Management

Chinese Stratagem(谋略)

Stratagem generally refers to scheming and military strategy (or tactics—taolue); the war planning (or scheme, plot—mohua) employed by the two opposing combatants to be used at different levels of military strategy, military campaign, and military tactics in order to obtain victory.

Common Cognitive Vulnerabilities & Exposures™ (CCVE)

Common Cognitive Vulnerabilities & Exploits (CCVEs) are perceptual distortions, cognitive biases, heuristics misapplied, or any mental process that exposes a person to a potential manipulation by an adversary.

Confirmation Bias

Category: Cognitive Processing

The tendency to seek information that confirms or supports a predetermined position or conclusion.

Devil Effect

Category: Interpersonal Biases

In assessing other people, it is the tendency for a person’s undesirable trait to be generalized to possess other poor traits.

Social Proof

Category: Social Norm Vulnerabilities

Tendency to take actions consistent with the actions of others, especially those we perceive as similar to ourselves. Can be exploited by either creating a referent group or referencing a referent group.

Suggestibility

Category: Other Psychological Vulnerabilities

Technique that attempts to implant a false memory in the target through suggestion. 

Disgruntlement

Category: Other Psychological Vulnerabilities

A feeling of dissatisfaction with one’s situation or circumstances. May be leveraged by an attacker by offering a path toward resolving the source disgruntlement as a means of manipulating the target.

Fear

Category: Other Psychological Vulnerabilities

An attacker leverages fear to gain target compliance.

Emotional Load

Category: Other Psychological Vulnerabilities

Affective responses--emotions, moods and feelings--effect cognition and perception. Media that intentionally causes a high degree of emotional load can significantly image how target audience member perceives and thinks about the subject of the media.

Mere Exposure Effect

Category: Cognitive Processing

The Mere Exposure Effect is a cognitive bias where individuals show a preference for things they’re more familiar with. Repeated exposure to a stimulus increases liking and familiarity, even without conscious recognition.

Familarity (and Illusion of Familiarity

Familiarity is the sense of knowing or recognizing someone (or something) due to previous exposure or experience. Things can feel familiar (even when they are not) when they seem recognizable (recognition heuristic) and easily understood (processing fluency)


Deepfake Attack Surface & Vectors

As part of the DSMAF criteria, Deepfake Attack Surface & Vectors assesses the intended target; the manner of control, or how the synthetic media is being presented to the target; and medium, or the type of synthetic media being presented to the intended target.


Intended Target

Both humans and automation may be targeted by synthetic media attacks. This criteria references whether the target of the attack was human or automation. The highlighted icon represents the intended target of this submitted media.


Human

Technical

Hybrid

Unknown



Control

A measure of if the attack was constructed by a human or by artificial intelligence. The highlighted icon represents the method of control of this submitted media.


Human

Automation

Hybrid

Unknown



Medium

The medium is the format of the content submitted. Highlighted items represent all of the various formats contained in the submitted content.


Text

Image

Video

Audio

Synthetic Media Exploitation Matrix

The Synthetic Media Exploitation Matrix Is a visual representation of the combined levels of attacker sophistication and maliciousness.

  • Sophistication is a judgment of the level of demonstrated technological prowess and capability involved in the attack.
  • Maliciousness is a conclusion regarding the degree to which the attack was deliberately intended to cause harm.

Sophistication

Moderate

Technical complexity of the atttack.

Sophistication
Maliciousness

Chart Not Available on Printed Version

Maliciousness

High

How damaging the attack was intended to be.



Motivations

Motivations are the underlying activators, purposes or sustained reasons for why the deepfake threat actor sought to create and take the necessary steps to produce and disseminate synthetic media or deepfake content.

Injecting Chaos

Chaos injection is the intentional introduction of evocative material--which is often ambiguous and unresolved--to cause confusion and disorder.

Evoke Hopelessness

Evoke feelings of hopelessness

Divisiveness

Create group, organization or societal division

Deception

Intentional strategy and tactics meant to mislead, misdirect and manipulate the perceptions of a target audience through simulation (showing the false) and/or dissimulation (hiding the real)

Provocation

Instigating, eliciting or forcing the target audience to take and action that is advantageous to the deepfake threat adversary

Political Tumult

The creator and/or disseminator of the media seeks to create political discord, argumentation and divisiveness.

Perception Management

Perception management is the deliberate effort to influence and control the perception of a target audience through strategic use of information, communication, and other practices to shape the way something is observed and interpreted.

The Deepfake Kill Chain™

The Deepfake Kill Chain™ describes the various, distinct, sequential stages of deepfake media creation and dissemination. Understanding these stages, and the adversary’s efficacy in the respective stages not only reveals the adversary’s modus operandi and decision-making process, but when contrasted with the Deepfake & Synthetic Media Analysis Framework™, identifies and elucidates methods of preventing and defending against the adversary’s deepfake attacks.

Motivation

Motivation is the underlying activator, purpose or sustained reasons for why the deepfake threat actor wants to create nefarious synthetic media.

CCP effort to disrupt and influence Taiwan Election

Targeting

Targeting is the threat actor’s intentional selection of a target audience, or the group or individual whom he is interested in impacting with his deepfake campaign.

Taiwan and Asia as prime target audience

Research and Reconnaissance

Research & Reconnaissance occurs when the threat actor is effortfully gathering information about the target audience, the optimal channels to conduct their campaign on, the relevant narratives for the attack, and type of content that will have the desired impact on the target audience.

Understanding and context surrounding Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-Te (賴清德)

Preparation and Planning

Preparation & Planning are the steps and processes that the threat actor takes to acquire the tools and content needed to create the deepfake media for their campaign and their deliberation for the execution of the campaign.

Collection of image and video materials of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-Te (賴清德)

Production

Production is the threat actor’s use of tools and content for the creation and development of deepfake media for their attack campaign.

Lower-quality Wav2Lip production

Narrative Testing

Narrative Testing. A narrative is a story, or an account of related events or experiences. A good narrative will have story coherence, such that both the story being told and its relationship to the real world are cohesive and clear. In deepfake campaigns, threat actors consider and evaluate the possible narratives—particularly in relation to events and context—to support the campaign in an effort to maximize the believability and efficacy of the attack.

Portraying Lai Ching-Te (賴清德) as supporting a coalition between the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and falsely depicted him commenting on DPP scandals

Deployment

Deployment is the threat actor’s intentional transmission of deepfake content to the target audience through selected online channels.

Taiwanese media and social media

Amplification

Amplification is the threat actor’s intentional efforts to maximize the visibility, virality and target audience exposure to their deepfake content.

Additional social media accounts and AI bot amplication

Post-Campaign

Post-Campaign is the period after the target audience has received and been exposed to the deepfake content.

This deepfake was one of many targeting Lai Ching-Te (賴清德) during the Taiwanese election



Cognitive Security Recommendations

This section identifies the steps and measures to prevent and defend against the synthetic media/deepfake content assessed in this DTIR. For a more detailed recommendation, training or consultation, connect with Psyber Labs.


Appendix

DTIR™ Version: 1.0

Submission Date (UTC): January 10, 2025 20:17

Assessment Date (UTC): January 10, 2025 21:01

SHA256 Hash: a6912f3915ed963c3946e0b42e53c9912db1381fb6ed6b72224bb26433c2b566

Source: https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/articles/10060; https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/articles/9949