Summary Threat Type Vulnerabilities Surface Matrix Motivations Kill Chain Recommendations Appendix
Print Report

Deepfake video of Yair Netanyahu in Hamas captivity

Submitted File

A deepfake video of Yair Netanyahu in Hamas captivity circulated on Israeli media on December 4, 2024. The video features Yair Netanyahu against the backdrop of Hamas tunnels in Gaza. Notably, the image of the Hams tunnels is strikingly similar to those provided earlier this year by the IDF. The deepfake "Yair addresses his father, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Threat Level

Low

Moderate

Elevated

High


Authenticity Spectrum

Real

Suspicious

Likely Fake

Fake



Deepfake Attack Profile

Credibility

Moderate

The more synthetic media is perceived to be legitimate and authoritative, the content is more likely to be trusted, persuasive, and acted upon.

Interactivity

Low

Synthetic media can range from non-interactive, not ongoing, or not consistent (low) to interactive, ongoing, and consistent (high).

Familiarity

Moderate

Synthetic media can range from very recognizable and familiar (high) or hardly (or not) recognizable and familiar (low).

Evocation

High

Synthetic media can range from evoking a significant affective response (high) to barely or not at all eliciting an affective reaction.

Distribution

Mediumcast

Synthetic media can range from broadcast to a wide human audience or technical security measures (high) to a narrow, specific human audience or tailored technical security measure (low).


Deepfake & Synthetic Media Analysis Framework (DSMAF) Assessment™. The media submitted for this Deepfake Threat Intelligence Report (DTIR) was assessed with the Psyber Labs Deepfake & Synthetic Media Analysis Framework (DSMAF)™, a set of psychological, sociological and affective influence factors and sub-facets, that when holistically applied, inform the motivations, intentions, and targeting process in synthetic media and deepfake propagation. The findings of each DSMAF factor is described in respective sections and graphically plotted on the Deepfake Risk Factor Radar. The combined DSMAF findings are given a Synthetic Media Threat Level (Low, Medium, Elevated, or High) for actionable awareness and risk mitigation.

Threat Type

Threat Type is the category of intended purpose and the risk proposed by the synthetic media or deepfake. Often, cyber deception efforts through deepfake content are multi-purpose, and a result, are categorized with multiple threat types.

This deepfake is meant to stir controversy, dialogue and pressure amidst hostages being held by HAMAS and lack of traction in negotiation for their release.

Digital Impersonation for Disinformation

Deepfake technology intentionally using the likeness of famous and/or credible authorities in an effort to shape the behaviors, attitudes, beliefs and/or emotions of the target audience

Collective Outrage Trigger

Adversaries seeking to outrage target audiences, resulting in collective mentality to mobilize into volatile engagements or damaging, violent protest

Propaganda

Information, especially of a biased, misleading or non-rational nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view

Non-Threatening: Raise Awareness

The media submission is not malicious, but rather, meant to raise awareness to the topic captured in the content.

Political Instigator

The media is intended to serve as a catalyst for political argument, discord and divisiveness.

Fabricated Content

Content created to serve an information or psychological operation purpose.

Common Cognitive Vulnerabilities & Exposures™ (CCVE)

Common Cognitive Vulnerabilities & Exploits (CCVEs) are perceptual distortions, cognitive biases, heuristics misapplied, or any mental process that exposes a person to a potential manipulation by an adversary.

The deepfake content leverages a variety of vulnerabilities to maximize efficacy

Confirmation Bias

Category: Cognitive Processing

The tendency to seek information that confirms or supports a predetermined position or conclusion.

Ingroup Bias

Category: Interpersonal Biases

Tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups.

Availability Heuristic

Category: Cognitive Processing

Information that is more readily available in memory is judged as more likely or more representative. Can be influenced by recency or emotional virulence of the memories.

Emotional Load

Category: Other Psychological Vulnerabilities

Affective responses--emotions, moods and feelings--effect cognition and perception. Media that intentionally causes a high degree of emotional load can significantly image how target audience member perceives and thinks about the subject of the media.

False Memory Implantation

Category: Other Psychological Vulnerabilities

False memory implantation is a recollection that seems real but is actually a fabricated or distorted recollection of an event by virtue of being fed untrue information about an event or experience. These memories may be entirely false and imaginary, or in some cases may contain elements of fact that have been distorted by interfering information or other memory distortions.

Mere Exposure Effect

Category: Cognitive Processing

The Mere Exposure Effect is a cognitive bias where individuals show a preference for things they’re more familiar with. Repeated exposure to a stimulus increases liking and familiarity, even without conscious recognition.


Deepfake Attack Surface & Vectors

As part of the DSMAF criteria, Deepfake Attack Surface & Vectors assesses the intended target; the manner of control, or how the synthetic media is being presented to the target; and medium, or the type of synthetic media being presented to the intended target.


Intended Target

Both humans and automation may be targeted by synthetic media attacks. This criteria references whether the target of the attack was human or automation. The highlighted icon represents the intended target of this submitted media.


Human

Technical

Hybrid

Unknown



Control

A measure of if the attack was constructed by a human or by artificial intelligence. The highlighted icon represents the method of control of this submitted media.


Human

Automation

Hybrid

Unknown



Medium

The medium is the format of the content submitted. Highlighted items represent all of the various formats contained in the submitted content.


Text

Image

Video

Audio

Synthetic Media Exploitation Matrix

The Synthetic Media Exploitation Matrix Is a visual representation of the combined levels of attacker sophistication and maliciousness.

  • Sophistication is a judgment of the level of demonstrated technological prowess and capability involved in the attack.
  • Maliciousness is a conclusion regarding the degree to which the attack was deliberately intended to cause harm.

Sophistication

High

Technical complexity of the atttack.

Sophistication
Maliciousness

Chart Not Available on Printed Version

Maliciousness

High

How damaging the attack was intended to be.



Motivations

Motivations are the underlying activators, purposes or sustained reasons for why the deepfake threat actor sought to create and take the necessary steps to produce and disseminate synthetic media or deepfake content.

This synthetic media was created based upon mixed-motivations.

Psychological Pressure

Psychological Pressure is the stress felt from perceived serious demands imposed on one person by another individual, group, or environment.

Deception

Intentional strategy and tactics meant to mislead, misdirect and manipulate the perceptions of a target audience through simulation (showing the false) and/or dissimulation (hiding the real)

Provocation

Instigating, eliciting or forcing the target audience to take and action that is advantageous to the deepfake threat adversary

Raise Awareness

Images, videos and audio media can be used to create and hold focal attention on issues, events and topics of concern. Raising awareness can be a particularly strong motivation in scenarios where the distributor of the media believes that the issue is worthy or attention and is not receiving adequate attention or action.

Political Tumult

The creator and/or disseminator of the media seeks to create political discord, argumentation and divisiveness.

Influence

Intentional effort to shape the perceptions, decisions, and behaviors of target audiences to achieve specific objectives.

Perception Management

Perception management is the deliberate effort to influence and control the perception of a target audience through strategic use of information, communication, and other practices to shape the way something is observed and interpreted.

Reputation Damage

The use of synthetic media and/or deception narratives to cause the deterioration of the public image of an individual, organization, or brand. This damage can result from the fabrication of various events, behaviors, or information that negatively influences how the affected entity is perceived by others.

The Deepfake Kill Chain™

The Deepfake Kill Chain™ describes the various, distinct, sequential stages of deepfake media creation and dissemination. Understanding these stages, and the adversary’s efficacy in the respective stages not only reveals the adversary’s modus operandi and decision-making process, but when contrasted with the Deepfake & Synthetic Media Analysis Framework™, identifies and elucidates methods of preventing and defending against the adversary’s deepfake attacks.

Motivation

Motivation is the underlying activator, purpose or sustained reasons for why the deepfake threat actor wants to create nefarious synthetic media.

The creators of this deepfake seek to exert pressure on the Israeli Government Leadership to continue negotiating for the release of the hostages held by HAMAS.

Targeting

Targeting is the threat actor’s intentional selection of a target audience, or the group or individual whom he is interested in impacting with his deepfake campaign.

The target audience of this campaign is meant to pressure Israeli government decision-makers and to gather traction/cause Israeli citizens to similarly pressure the Israeli government.

Research and Reconnaissance

Research & Reconnaissance occurs when the threat actor is effortfully gathering information about the target audience, the optimal channels to conduct their campaign on, the relevant narratives for the attack, and type of content that will have the desired impact on the target audience.

Substantial research was conducted on Yair Netanyahu to understand his appearance, voice dynamics and life posture

Preparation and Planning

Preparation & Planning are the steps and processes that the threat actor takes to acquire the tools and content needed to create the deepfake media for their campaign and their deliberation for the execution of the campaign.

Visual content and voice exemplars were collected to train a model for adequate production.

Production

Production is the threat actor’s use of tools and content for the creation and development of deepfake media for their attack campaign.

A model was trained to create a hyper-realistic video with audio. Intentional and plausible video artifacts were produced to make it appear like authentic, low-quality video captured in Hamas tunnels.

Narrative Testing

Narrative Testing. A narrative is a story, or an account of related events or experiences. A good narrative will have story coherence, such that both the story being told and its relationship to the real world are cohesive and clear. In deepfake campaigns, threat actors consider and evaluate the possible narratives—particularly in relation to events and context—to support the campaign in an effort to maximize the believability and efficacy of the attack.

The narrative is shaped to cause the target audience to feel pressure to negotiate with Hamas for the release of hostages.

Deployment

Deployment is the threat actor’s intentional transmission of deepfake content to the target audience through selected online channels.

Historical artifacts suggest that the deployment origin was through (Hebrew: מטה המשפחות להחזרת החטופים והנעדרים)

Amplification

Amplification is the threat actor’s intentional efforts to maximize the visibility, virality and target audience exposure to their deepfake content.

The deepfake was shared and amplified to additional audiences over social media

Post-Campaign

Post-Campaign is the period after the target audience has received and been exposed to the deepfake content.

No significant post-campaign



Cognitive Security Recommendations

This section identifies the steps and measures to prevent and defend against the synthetic media/deepfake content assessed in this DTIR. For a more detailed recommendation, training or consultation, connect with Psyber Labs.


Appendix

DTIR™ Version: 1.0

Submission Date (UTC): December 08, 2024 20:02

Assessment Date (UTC): December 16, 2024 20:04

SHA256 Hash: ebfa10dc5d12bb954bcdb3766ab28c439205c0a82af596f74f14253c9f5a8a6d


Notes:

"My name is Yair Netanyahu, 33 years old, From Jerusalem...uh, Miami, Caesarea. I've been here in Hamas captivity with almost no food or water, without seeing the sun or breathing fresh air." "My life is in danger because of IDF bombings. Hamas is protecting me from Israeli aggression. Now that there's a ceasefire in the North, it's time to release us. I'm asking you, Dad, Mom - free me. Only you can do it..." "I see the polls on all the channels—most people support a deal. Please remember me! Please do everything! I miss my freedom, you, and Avner. I want to come home. Please reach a deal."